Vaughn Rasmussen v. Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association, the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Okland-Foulger Company : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Vaughn Rasmussen v. Deseret Federal Savings and
Loan Association, the Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States, Okland-Foulger
Company : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Reed L. Martineau; Rex E. Madsen; Stephen J. Hill; John R. Lund; Snow, Christensen and
Martineau; Attorneys for Appellant.
Robert S. Clark; Ronald G. Russell; Larsen, Kimball, Parr and Crockett; Robert M. Anderson;
Richard D. Parry; Hansen and Anderson; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Rasmussen v. Deseret Federal Savings, No. 860105.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/899
VIM ' 
DCC .::../•• 
K r U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. ^QlQ^c^ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN RASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
corporation, THE EQUITABLE 
LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF 
THE UNITED STATES, a New 
York Corporation, and 
OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY, a 
Maryland joint venture, dba 
Crossroads Plaza Associates, 
Defendants/Respondents 
f60/0S~r £6>0/0&-£/? 
No. 20512 
and 
No. 20755 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Robert S. Clark 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR & CROCKETT 
185 South State Street, 
Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Deseret Federal 
Robert M. Anderson 
Richard D. Parry 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Crossroads 
Reed L. Martineau 
Rex E. Madsen 
Stephen J. Hill 
John R. Lund 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN 271986 
Clerk, Supreme Court Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN RASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND No. 20512 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
corporation, THE EQUITABLE and 
LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF 
THE UNITED STATES, a New No. 20755 
York Corporation, and 
OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY, a 
Maryland joint venture, dba 
Crossroads Plaza Associates, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Robert S. Clark 
LARSEN, KIMBALL, PARR & CROCKETT 
185 South State Street, 
Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Deseret Federal 
Robert M. Anderson 
Richard D. Parry 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Reed L. Martineau 
Rex E. Madsen 
Stephen J. Hill 
John R. Lund 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Crossroads 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Introduction 2 
POINT I 
ISSUES OF FACT REMAIN CONCERNING THE 
ISSUE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 3 
POINT II 
THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT MEMORANDUM TO 
SATISFY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS . . . , 
POINT III 
RASMUSSEN'S PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE 
PARTIES' AGREEMENT SATISFIES THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 8 
POINT IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CROSSROADS' 
COUNTERCLAIM WAS IMPROPER 10 
Conclusion 13 
-i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Duqan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) 11 
Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548 (Utah 1979) 6, 7 
Heath Techna Corp. v. Zions First National Bank, 
609 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1980) 3 
Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985) 12 
Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983) 8 
McKinnon v. Corporation of the President of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974) 3 
Other Authorities 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 8 
51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 76 (1970) . . . 12 
-ii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN RASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
corporation, THE EQUITABLE 
LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF 
THE UNITED STATES, a New 
York Corporation, and 
OKLAND-FOULGER COMPANY, a 
Maryland joint venture, dba 
Crossroads Plaza Associates, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant Vaughn Rasmussen ("Rasmussen") submits the 
following reply to the briefs of Respondents Deseret Federal 
Savings S Loan Association ("Deseret Federal") and Crossroads 
Plaza Associates ("Crossroads"). 
No. 20512 
and 
No. 20755 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rasmussen claims in this case that Deseret Federal and 
Crossroads breached their agreement with him under which 
Deseret Federal agreed to release to Rasmussen a portion of its 
leased space at Level One of Crossroads Plaza and Crossroads in 
turn agreed to relet that space to Rasmussen. The lower court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Crossroads and Deseret 
Federal on the basis of the statute of frauds. The lower court 
also granted summary judgment on Crossroads' counterclaim that 
Rasmussen is liable for unpaid rent. 
This reply first addresses the arguments of both Crossroads 
and Deseret Federal that (1) their acts and conduct do not give 
rise to the application of promissory estoppel to prevent their 
reliance on the statute of frauds; (2) there were insufficient 
memoranda of the parties' agreement to satisfy the statute of 
frauds; and (3) Rasmussen's acts and conduct in reliance on the 
promises of Crossroads and Deseret Federal are insufficient 
performance to satisfy the statute of frauds. As shown below, 
there remain issues of fact as to whether promissory estoppel, 
memoranda of the parties, or Rasmussen's part performance 
satisfies the statute of frauds. 
The final section of the brief addresses Crossroads' argu-
ment that the lower court correctly granted summary judgment on 
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its counterclaim for unpaid rent. As shown below, there remain 
issues of fact relating to the counterclaim as well. 
The lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
respondents must be reviewed in light of the following standard 
announced by this Court: 
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law, and the evidence, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the loser, must show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact. 
Heath Techna Corp. v. Zions First National Bank, 609 P.2d 1334, 
1336 (Utah 1980). Viewing the facts of record in the light 
most favorable to Rasmussen, the lower court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of respondents on both Rasmussen's claims and 
Crossroads' counterclaim must be reversed. 
POINT I 
ISSUES OF FACT REMAIN CONCERNING THE ISSUE 
OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL. 
The issue before the court is whether promissory estoppel 
bars application of the statute of frauds with respect to the 
agreement of the parties under which Deseret Federal agreed to 
release certain space on Level One of Crossroads Plaza to 
Rasmussen and Crossroads agreed to relet that space to 
Rasmussen. Both respondents cite McKinnon v. Corporation of 
the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
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Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Utah 1974), for the proposition 
that promissory estoppel does not bar application of the 
statute of frauds unless "[t]he acts and conduct of the 
promisor . . . so clearly manifest an intention that he will 
not assert the statute that to permit him to do so would be to 
work a fraud upon the other party." Rasmussen recognizes that 
in order for him to prevail on the estoppel issue, there must 
be genuine issues of material fact under that standard. 
Here, there is no question but that fact issues remain as 
to whether respondents' acts and conduct induced Rasmussen to 
act and manifested that they did not intend to assert statute 
of frauds. It is undisputed that Deseret Federal, by its 
January 13, 1983, letter (R 175, Exhibit 2), appointed 
Crossroads its agent to consummate the agreement the parties 
had reached concerning the lease of Level One space to 
Rasmussen. (See Deseret Federal Brief at p. 13.) After 
receipt of that letter, Bruce Barcal, acting as agent for both 
Crossroads and Deseret Federal, repeatedly represented to 
Rasmussen that the lease documents would be forthcoming and 
everything was in order. R. 158, 175 (Rasmussen Depo. at 26, 
31). Barcal also assured Rasmussen that he could proceed with 
financing, remodeling plans, and purchase of inventory in 
reliance on the parties' agreement and Rasmussen did so in 
reliance on those assurances. R. 157-158. In February, 1983, 
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Barcal told Rasmussen that the leases were coming by Federal 
Express on two separate occasions. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. at 
45). Later, in a letter dated March 9, 1983, Barcal advised 
Deseret Federal and Rasmussen that a lease surrender form and 
leases would arrive in approximately five business days. R. 
161. Barcal*s promises of forthcoming lease documents and 
repeated assurances that he could take action in reliance on 
those promises, which are not disputed in the record before 
this court, raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether 
Barcal's statements and conduct as agent for both respondents 
manifest an intention that respondents would not assert the 
statute of frauds and preclude respondents from relying on the 
statute. 
Deseret Federal's argument that promissory estoppel was not 
raised in the court below is without merit. The elements of 
estoppel were all set forth in Rasmussen's Complaint. R. 2-7. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT MEMORANDUM TO SATISFY 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Both respondents dispute that the documents relied on by 
Rasmussen constitute sufficient memoranda to satisfy the 
statute of frauds. In making that determination, the court 
should consider the documents together along with parol 
-5-
evidence relating to them. Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548, 
549-50 (Utah 1979). 
The letter of January 13, 1983, from Howard Swapp of 
Deseret Federal to Bruce Barcal (Crossroads' agent), clearly 
manifests Deseret Federal's agreement to release the subject 
space. R. 175, Exhibit 2. The reference in the agreement to 
negotiation of a proposal clearly relates to the past; the 
letter is a manifestation that as between Deseret Federal and 
Rasmussen an agreement had been reached as set out in the 
letter. The March 9, 1983, letter from Bruce Barcal to Bruce 
Cundick of Deseret Federal evidences Crossroads' agreement 
(which had been reached initially in August 1982) to release 
Deseret Federal from its lease of the subject space and to 
relet the space to Vaughn Rasmussen. R. 161. The terms of the 
Deseret Federal's agreement to release its space are set forth 
in the AGREEMENT it delivered to Rasmussen on March 9, 1983. 
R. 175, Exhibit 14. The terms of the lease are all memorial-
ized in the lease documents finally delivered to Rasmussen in 
April 1983, and are the same as those agreed to orally in 
August 1982. R. 9-45, 155-159. 
The discrepancy between Deseret Federal's January 13, 1983 
letter (950 sq. ft.) and Barcal's March 19, 1983 letter (790 
sq. ft.) as to the amount of space to be leased is insignifi-
cant. The parties certainly had no question as to the location 
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of the space to be leased to Rasmussen and parol evidence would 
be admissible to precisely define the exact description of the 
space. Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548, 549-50 (Utah 1979). 
Crossroads' brief quotes Rasmussen as acknowledging at his 
deposition that whatever documents were generated by Barcal as 
leasing agent would have to be approved by the owner. 
Crossroads Brief at 17. Crossroads fails to explain, however, 
that at the time that testimony was given it was in the context 
of a discussion of meetings with Barcal in July 1982 before an 
agreement with Crossroads was reached. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 
at 26-27). Crossroads omits Rasmussen*s testimony that later 
"Mr. Barcal assured both me and Mr. Matheson on various occa-
sions that the lease and everything was in order and that we 
could proceed with our loan, inventory and plans." R. 175 
(Rasmussen Depo. at 28). Rasmussen added that as of December 
1982 Barcal "had said previously on many occasions that every-
thing was in order - the landlord had approved the terms of the 
lease." R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. at 31). 
The failure of the lease to finally be signed was due to 
Barcal's failure, as agent for both parties, to timely deliver 
the lease documents to Rasmussen. After March 15, Barcal 
finally provided the lease, but by that time Deseret Federal 
would agree only to a sublease, which was unacceptable to 
Crossroads. R. 46-50. 
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In sum, Rasmussen innocently took actions to his detriment 
as a result of written manifestations of agreements made by 
both Deseret Federal and Crossroads, as well as the promises 
continually made to him by their agent Bruce Barcal. Respon-
dents unfairly whipsawed Rasmussen. Both of them failed to 
perform as promised. Certainly questions of fact exist in this 
case as to whether the documents referred to and relied on by 
Rasmussen constitute sufficient memoranda to satisfy the stat-
ute of frauds. Failure to so find would result in the statute 
of frauds being used to perpetrate a fraud against Rasmussen. 
POINT III 
RASMUSSEN1S PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE 
PARTIES' AGREEMENT SATISFIES THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. 
Both respondents also dispute that Rasmussen's part perfor-
mance satisfies the statute of frauds. As shown in Rasmussen's 
opening brief, the doctrine of part performance is satisfied 
when the following standard is met: 
First, the oral contract must be clear and definite; 
second, the acts done in performance of the contract 
must be equally clear and definite; and third, the 
acts must be in reliance on the contract. 
Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983). The doctrine 
of part performance, as its name indicates, requires only par-
tial performance of the parties' agreement, not full perfor-
mance as maintained by Deseret Federal, id.; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-8. 
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The parties1 agreement contemplated, among other things, 
that Rasmussen obtain plans for remodeling of the subject space 
and obtain funds sufficient to accomplish the remodeling. R. 
156, 175 (Rasmussen Depo., Ex. 14). At a bare minimum, 
Rasmussen performed in accordance with those conditions by 
obtaining plans for remodeling and obtaining an SBA loan to 
provide sufficient funds for the remodeling. There is no 
evidence whatever that Rasmussen undertook those efforts for 
any purpose other than to perform under his agreement with 
Crossroads and Deseret Federal. The argument that those acts 
were merely preparatory acts and are not exclusively referrable 
to the performance of the oral lease agreement is specious; as 
the agreement Deseret Federal delivered to Vaughn Rasmussen in 
March of 1983 indicates, those acts went to the essence of the 
parties' agreement. Crossroads' suggestion in its brief at 
p. 18 that Rasmussen's obtaining plans and incurring remodeling 
expenses were equally consistent with Rasmussen's obtaining a 
sublease from Deseret Federal might make sense except that when 
those acts were performed there had been no discussion of any 
agreement but the agreement to lease from Crossroads; the 
sublease proposal was made after March 15, 1983, following 
Barcal's failure on behalf of both respondents to timely 
deliver the leases. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. at 65-66). In any 
event, there exist questions of fact as to the precise terms 
-9-
of the agreement and whether Rasmussen's acts constituted part 
performance of those terms. 
POINT IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CROSSROADS' COUNTERCLAIM 
WAS IMPROPER. 
The court below granted Crossroads' summary judgment for 
unpaid rent over the unrefuted affidavit of Vaughn Rasmussen 
stating facts showing fraud in the inducement of the subject 
lease. Crossroads argues that summary judgment was proper 
because (1) Rasmussen*s reply to its counterclaim raising the 
fraud defense was untimely; (2) Rasmussen waived the right to 
raise the defense; and (3) the statute of limitations bars the 
defense. None of these arguments is meritorious. 
Crossroads cites not a single authority for the proposition 
that the delay in submission of a reply to a counterclaim 
results in a waiver of the defenses raised in th€» reply. As 
required by the rules, Rasmussen raised the defense of fraud in 
his reply to Crossroads' counterclaim. Even if he had not, 
under the liberal policy of the rules of procedure, Rasmussen 
should have been entitled to amend his original pleading to 
assert the defense, and even to amend his pleadings to raise 
the defense following trial to conform with the evidence. Rule 
15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Crossroads was put on 
notice. There is simply no basis for finding a waiver. 
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Crossroads would have this court in effect grant it a default 
judgment without it having timely taken any action to obtain 
one. See Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is simply 
too late for Crossroads to complain at this stage. 
With respect to the issue of waiver, Crossroads has the 
burden of showing that Rasmussen intentionally relinquished its 
right to raise the defense. Such requires Crossroads to offer 
proof of that Rasmussen, after obtaining knowledge of the 
fraud, continued to perform or otherwise ratify the contract. 
Crossroads has failed to furnish such evidence. 
Moreover, as in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247, "[i]t 
is only when there is a new agreement between the parties, 
after discovery of the fraud, the court may find a waiver of 
the fraud action [for damages]." There is no such new agree-
ment in this case. Hence, Rasmussen's affirmative defense of 
set-off, being in substance a claim for damages, cannot have 
been waived. 
Crossroads contends Rasmussen*s pleading is deficient for 
failure to allege that he commenced performance prior to dis-
covery of the fraud. Rasmussen's fraud claim is raised by way 
of affirmative defense. Under normal rules of pleading, all 
that is required is a short and plain statement of the defense, 
rather than the detailed statement required when a claim is 
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made affirmatively. See, Rule 8(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rasmussen's defense is adequately pleaded. 
Crossroads' final argument is that Rasmussen's fraud 
defense is barred by the statute of limitations. However, the 
statute of limitations, by its own terms, applies only to the 
maintenance of actions, not defenses. Utah Code Ann. 
78-12-26(3). The general rule concerning application of 
statutes of limitation to matters of defense is as follows: 
The ultimate purpose of a limitations lies to bar 
actions rather than to suppress or deny matters of 
defense. Hence, as a gcmeral rule, limitation stat-
utes are not applicable to defenses, but apply only 
where affirmative relief is sought. 
51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 76 (1970). The numer-
ous cases cited in Rasmussen's opening brief are to the same 
effect. 
Moreover, in Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Utah 
1985), this court stated that a counterclaim could be set-off 
against the plaintiff's claim notwithstanding the statute of 
limitations. Even if Crossroads is correct that for the 
statute of limitations not to apply to Rasmussen's fraud claim 
for set-off, his claim must not have been time-barred at the 
time Crossroads' claim arose, Crossroads has failed to offer 
any proof as to when Rasmussen discovered the fraud. There-
fore, there is no basis for determining whether or not the 
claims of Rasmussen and Crossroads at some point overlapped. 
Summary judgment, therefore, was improper. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, fact issues remain both with 
respect to Rasmussen's claims against Crossroads and Deseret 
Federal, and also with respect to Crossroads' claim for unpaid 
rent against Rasmussen. The lower court's grant of summary 
judgment to Crossroads and Deseret Federal should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^IfL day of January, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Rex E.' Madsen 
Stephen J. Hill 
John R. Lund 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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